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AbstrAct
This paper aims to analyze the relative neglect often given to interna-
tional law under philosophy of  law studies. Within this context, the rela-
tionship between law and reasoning, in the light of  the international realm, 
is taken in a broader level to understand the role played by this field of  
knowledge in H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of  Law, among other works of  re-
ference. With the consolidation of  normative and jurisprudential work of  
several international fora, such as the United Nations, its affiliate agencies, 
and many international courts other than the International Court of  Justice, 
international law has given rise to several legal phenomena worth understan-
ding through a philosophical perspective. Regardless of  the field of  study, 
whether humanitarian law, international economic law, or transnational jus-
tice, the social and political role international law plays nowadays has been 
growing exponentially.Notwithstanding its importance, there is a current ne-
gligence to the philosophy of  international law among authors from all over 
the world. Despite researching fields such as distributive justice, group jus-
tice and transnational justice, not enough thought is put into understanding 
current legal theories behind international law, neither into the possibility 
of  conceiving a moral theory in the context of  legal pluralism. In view of  
these main issues, the article aims not only to examine international law as a 
viable field of  study for the philosophy of  law in the context of  legal plura-
lism, but also to further understand its developmental consequences for the 
international order. Therefore, this article analyzes with remarkable concern 
the importance of  the global expansion of  human rights in order to better 
examine the role that international human rights can play in the definition 
of  a international legal order.
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sportivo e Negócios do Esporte pelo Centro 
de Direito Internacional (CEDIN). Bacharel 
em Direito pela Universidade de Brasília (UnB). 
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resumo
Este trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a relativa 
negligência, muitas vezes do direito internacional estu-
dos de filosofia direito. Dentro deste contexto, a relação 
entre direito e do raciocínio, à luz do domínio interna-
cional, é tomada em um nível mais amplo para enten-
der o papel desempenhado por este campo de conheci-
mento a luz de “O Conceito de Direito”, de Hart, entre 
outras obras de referência. Com a consolidação do 
trabalho normativo e jurisprudencial de vários fóruns 
internacionais, como a família onusiana, o direito inter-
nacional deu origem a vários fenômenos jurídicos que 
podem ser compreendidos através de uma perspectiva 
filosófica. Independentemente do campo de estudo, se 
direito humanitário, direito econômico internacional, 
ou a justiça transnacional, o direito internacional de-
sempenha um crescente papel social e político. O artigo 
tem como objetivo não só para examinar o direito inter-
nacional como um campo viável de estudo para a filo-
sofia do direito no contexto do pluralismo jurídico, mas 
também para entender melhor as suas consequências 
para o desenvolvimento para a ordem internacional. 
Portanto, este artigo analisa com notável preocupação a 
importância da expansão global dos direitos humanos, a 
fim de examinar melhor o papel que os direitos huma-
nos internacionais podem desempenhar na definição de 
uma ordem jurídica internacional.
Palavras-chave: Pluralismo jurídico. A justiça transna-
cional. Direitos humanos.
1. Introductory remArks
Scholarly circles in international law and philosophy 
of  law have been experiencing the very striving task to 
revive the foundations of  the philosophical thought 
and explain what may be considered the core concerns 
of  both subjects nowadays: power, authority, moral, 
justice, adjudication, coercion, enforcement, and obli-
gations1.  This necessary approximation is not only a 
1 See, for instance, BUCHANAN, Allen; GOLOVE, David. Phi-
losophy of  international law. In: COLEMAN, Jules L.; HIMMA, 
Kenneth Einar; SHAPIRO, Scott J. The Oxford handbook of  jurispru-
dence and philosophy of  law. Oxford: Oxford University, 2002. p. 868-
934. p. 868 et seq; FINNIS, John. Natural law: the classical tradition. 
In: COLEMAN, Jules L., HIMMA, Kenneth, SHAPIRO, Scott. The 
Oxford handbook of  jurisprudence and philosophy of  law. Oxford: Oxford 
University, 2002. p. 1-39; TESSON, Fernando R. Philosophy of  in-
matter of  academic convenience, but it is rather an ex-
traordinary opportunity for scholars to critically reflect 
on the main contemporary theories involving the nature 
and philosophical justification of  conceptual and nor-
mative issues of  international law and its institutions.
A first methodological concern appears to be the 
investigation of  the main existing concepts and unders-
tandings of  normativity and how they are associated 
to international legal order and the main roles of  the 
international regulatory, law-making and adjudicatory 
institutions. Secondly, philosophy of  international and 
its theoretical proponents would be very prepared to 
design theoretical proposals for analysis of  the key in-
teractions between law, morality and politics within the 
international legal order, challenging, for instance, the 
mainstream approach of  global governance in interna-
tional law. 
Further, philosophy of  international law could be 
better adjusted to formulate critical inputs to the cur-
rent state of  art of  the academic debate surrounding 
legal positivism, realism in international relations, na-
tural law and new non-positivist circles in internatio-
nal legal scholarship2.  The potential merger between 
two traditional subjects in legal studies can overcome 
the outdated plain discussions about the relationship 
between international law and municipal law (usually 
based on a voluntary return to the Manichaeism of  mo-
nism vs. dualism), or about the decentralized nature of  
international legal order, often conceived as the main 
constraint for legitimacy and enforcement.  
Any sound criticism would then be justified by the 
impetus of  a theory sufficient to explain the foundations 
of  international law and able to ascertain the normative 
parameters for their proper interpretation of  normative 
issues (e.g. justice, moral, adjudication, legitimacy) in in-
ternational law and enforcement of  international rules 
by the existing institutions (international organizations, 
international courts and national courts themselves).  In 
doing so, philosophy of  international law (and revisited 
ternational law. In: MAY, Larry; BROWN, Jeff  (Ed.). Philosophy of  
law: classic and contemporary readings. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2010, p. 187-199. p. 187; BESSON, Samantha; TASIOULAS, John.
Introduction. In: ______ (Ed.). The philosophy of  international law.New 
York: Oxford University, 2010. p. 1-32. p. 1 et seq;
2 Critically, see the opposing views in GOLDSMITH, Jack L.; 
POSNER, Eric A. The limits of  international law.New York: Oxford 
University, 2005; and DWORKING, Ronald. ‘A new philosophy 
for international law. Philosophy and Public Affairs, v. 41, n. 1, p. 2-30, 
Winter 2013. 
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proposals for the philosophical foundations of  interna-
tional law) will constitute a very important key for the 
comprehension of  the dynamics of  the more interde-
pendent international community.
It may assist us to deviate from the old risks (and ob-
session) to associate the existing international legal or-
der to a set or bundle of  national legal orders, based on 
voluntarism and state-centered perspectives, both taken 
as core arguments for the justification for the functio-
ning of  a rudimentary international system of  states
This paper is an attempt to tackle some of  the pen-
ding issues related to contemporary research agenda 
of  philosophy of  international law. It is based on the 
analysis of  Jeremy Waldron’s paper, entitled “Interna-
tional Law: a Relatively Small and Unimportant Part 
of  Jurisprudence”?3, and Allen Buchanan and David 
Golove’s “The Philosophy of  International Law”4, in whi-
ch various aspects of  the current scholarly internatio-
nal legal debate are addressed.  This subject is parti-
cularly relevant with regard to the parallels Waldron 
establishes with the work of  H.L.A. Hart,The Concept of  
Law5,inwhich he questions the analysis that Hart deve-
lops about the validity of  international law as a systema-
tic and singular branch of  law.
Buchanan and Golove, on the other hand, agree that 
there is a certain neglect of  the philosophy of  inter-
national law, thus remarking in their paper some issues 
that are currently discussed in academic circles in the 
field of  political philosophy, but not of  philosophy of  
international law, such as distributive justice and trans-
national justice, for example.
In this context, rather than simply understand the 
reasons why there is some theoretical negligence in rela-
tion to the study of  the philosophy of  international law, 
this paper investigates the current trends on the analysis 
3 WALDRON, Jeremy. International law: ‘a relatively small and 
unimportant’ part of  jurisprudence? NYU School of  Law, Public Law 
Research Paper n. 13-56, p. 209-223, Oct. 2013. Available at: <http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2326758>. Ac-
cessed on: 5 apr. 2015.
4 BUCHANAN, Allen; GOLOVE David. Philosophy of  inter-
national law. In: COLEMAN, Jules L.; HIMMA, Kenneth Einar; 
SHAPIRO, Scott J. The Oxford handbook of  jurisprudence and philosophy 
of  law. Oxford: Oxford University, 2002. p. 868-934.
5 HART, H. L. A. The concept of  law. 2. ed. New York: Oxford 
University, 1994. p. 213-237. Available at: <http://nw18.american.
edu/~dfagel/Class%20Readings/Hart/International%20Law%20
Chapter%20From%20Concept%20of%20Law.pdf>. Accessed on: 
3 apr. 2015. 
of  the nature of  international law, admitted as a legal 
theory for international law, and the possibility of  con-
ceiving a moral theory in the context of  international 
law.
Our proposal of  analysis for these core issues of  
research is presented in five sections. In addition to this 
first introductory item, the second item analyzes the 
problem of  neglect of  the philosophy of  international 
law, from the perspective of  authors such as Buchanan 
and Golove,andby contextualizing their work with the 
authoritative work of  other theorists on the subject.The 
third item explores the criticism proposed  by Waldron 
with regard to Hart, the so-called opportunity costs in-
volved in the lack of  analyzing international law throu-
ghout in his work. In section four, we analyze the key 
aspects ofthe challenges faced by Buchanan and Golo-
vewithin the domain of  international law nowadays. In 
our concluding remarks, we stress the importance of  
the recent changesoccurring in the field of  international 
law, as well as trends for its future development.
2. the problem of neglect of the phIlosophy 
of InternAtIonAl lAw
InThe Philosophy of  InternationalLaw,Buchanan and 
Golove argue what they call a“curious neglect”conferred 
on the philosophy of  international law. According to 
the authors, contemporary political philosophers alrea-
dy tend to neglect international relations in their studies, 
having even less to say about the philosophy of  inter-
national law.Most contemporary philosophers of  law 
sometimes even act as if  there were not an international 
legal system to be theorized6.
Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas also raise this 
neglect with regard to the philosophy of  international 
6 According to Buchanan and Golove: “Contemporary political 
philosophers trend to neglect international relations.Contemporary 
philosophers of  law usually have even less to say about the phi-
losophy of  international law.Rawls’s work has dominated political 
philosophy for more than a quarter of  a century, but only recently 
has he extended his theory to the international sphere, And then 
only in the rather skeletal fashion. The contemporary major philoso-
phers of  law largely proceed to if  there were in Legal international 
system to be theorized about”. BUCHANAN, Allen; GOLOVE, 
David. Philosophy of  international law. In: COLEMAN, Jules L.; 
HIMMA, Kenneth Einar; SHAPIRO, Scott J. The Oxford handbook of  
jurisprudence and philosophy of  law. Oxford: Oxford University, 2002. p. 
868-934. p. 868.
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law, which ended up being left behind at a period to 
which the authors refer as the rebirth of  the philoso-
phy of  law (since 1960, through the works of  Hart and 
Rawls)7. Previously to the current scholarship discus-
sing philosophical foundations of  international law, 
some authors contended that the fundamental neglect 
was associated to the way how legal education spread a 
vague and flat approach on the role of  international law 
and international institutions: instruments to commerce 
and diplomacy8.
The main criticism is also consistent with observa-
tions that Jeremy Waldron makes with regard to Hart’s 
work,International Law: a Relatively Small and Unimportant 
Part of  Jurisprudence.Among the remarks made by Wal-
dron in relation to Hart´s ideas in Chapter X of  The 
Concept of  Law, one could notice the neglect in relation 
to international law. To Waldron, Hart´s omission im-
paired international law´s theoretical appeal, particularly 
because he could have better contributed to the debate 
on the interface with legal philosophy.
According to Hart, with regard to his conception of  
the theorization international law:
It resembles, as we have said, in form though not 
at all in content, a simple regime of  primary or 
customary law. Yet some theorists, in their anxiety to 
defend against the skeptic the title of  international 
law to be called ‘law’, have succumbed to the 
temptation to minimize these formal differences, 
and to exaggerate the analogies, which can be found 
in international law to legislation or other desirable 
formal features of  municipal law9.
Therefore, the author then made an effort to address 
the “issue” of  an emergent field of  study in the philo-
sophy of  law. Despite Hart’s efforts, his assertions were 
based on a considerably different international scenario 
than the one exiting by the time Buchanan and Golove 
published their research.
To further exemplify Hart’s contention, the author 
7 According to Besson and Tasioulas: “Yet it is the case that, un-
til comparatively recently, the post-1960 revival of  cool philosophy 
has tended to neglect international law”. BESSON, Samantha; TA-
SIOULAS, John.Introduction. In: ______ (Ed.). The philosophy of  
international law.New York: Oxford University, 2010. p. 1-32. p. 17.
8 DUMBAUD, Edward. The place of  philosophy in international 
law. University of  Pennsylvania Law Review, Philadelphia, v. 83, n. 5, p. 
590-606, 1935.
9 HART, H. L. A. The concept of  law. 2. ed. New York: Oxford 
University, 1994. p. 232. Available at: <http://nw18.american.
edu/~dfagel/Class%20Readings/Hart/International%20Law%20
Chapter%20From%20Concept%20of%20Law.pdf>. Accessed on: 
3 apr. 2015.
points out that:
[...] Though it is consistent with the usage of  the 
last 150 years to use the expression ‘law’ here, the 
absence of  an international legislature, courts with 
compulsory jurisdiction, and centrally organized 
sanctions have inspired misgivings, at any rate in 
the breasts of  legal theorists.10.
In addition, there is even a more problematic fact, 
which is that the minority of  political philosophers that 
seek to extend their normative vision to the field of  
international relations, for the most part, have ceased 
to be explicit about the role of  positive theory in this 
attempt. According to Buchanan and Golove, the way 
is clear even for the development of  a moral theory of  
international law. According to the authors, the structu-
re of  a moral theory of  international law would consist 
of  the following elements, basically comprising moral 
grounds, accomplishment of  goals, legitimacy and en-
forcement:
The fundamental structure of  a normative theory 
of  international law, the ideal theory, would 
consist of  the following elements: (1) an account 
of  the moral point, or goals of  the institution of  
international law, the most fundamental moral 
values it ought to serve, (2) an articulation of  the 
moral reasons for supporting the institution of  
international law as a means of  achieving those 
goals or serving those values, (3) the specification 
of  the conditions under which the international 
legal system would be legitimate, at least in the 
sense of  there being an adequate justification for 
the processes of  creating and enforcing the rules 
of  the system,(4) a statement ofand justification for 
the most important substantive principles of  the 
system.11
Buchanan and Golove listed three factors respon-
ding for this relative underdeveloped state of  the philo-
sophy of  international law. First, the fact that scholars 
neglect institutional moral theory. This means that the 
core moral principles of  international law would neces-
sarily be difficult to be institutionalized due to the fact 
that their eventual abandonment (to implement other 
institutional principles case by case, for example) is pro-
10 HART, H. L. A. The concept of  law. 2. ed. New York: Oxford 
University, 1994. p. 214. Available at: <http://nw18.american.
edu/~dfagel/Class%20Readings/Hart/International%20Law%20
Chapter%20From%20Concept%20of%20Law.pdf>. Accessed on: 
3 apr. 2015.
11 BUCHANAN, Allen; GOLOVE, David. Philosophy of  inter-
national law. In: COLEMAN, Jules L.; HIMMA, Kenneth Einar; 
SHAPIRO, Scott J. The Oxford handbook of  jurisprudence and philosophy 
of  law. Oxford: Oxford University, 2002. p. 868-934. p. 881-882.
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hibitive and too restrictive12.
The second factor would be directly related to the 
realist theory of  international relations13, to which the 
moral theoretical approach of  international relations 
and, therefore, of  international law, would be futile.
More recently, even though realism has been challen-
ged by several critics regarding its most important as-
sumptions, and, more systematically, by liberal positi-
vist theories, it is precisely its pessimistic implications 
for normative initiative that persist.This is particularly 
relevant with regard to political philosophers and legal 
philosophers who are not intimate with the main weak-
nesses of  this theory (realism).14
Finally, many authors tend to project a disparaging 
perspective of  the philosophy of  international law in 
their works. Buchanan and Golove assert that, in the 
very least, this field of  law is described only as a pale 
shadow of  what we call a legal system15. The most ex-
treme form of  this point of  view, the legal nihilism16, even 
12 BUCHANAN, Allen; GOLOVE, David. Philosophy of  inter-
national law. In: COLEMAN, Jules L.; HIMMA, Kenneth Einar; 
SHAPIRO, Scott J. The Oxford handbook of  jurisprudence and philosophy 
of  law. Oxford: Oxford University, 2002. p. 868-934. p. 870.
13 According to Amado Luiz Cervo, the fundamentals of  realistic 
theory of  international relations may be rejected by the very honor 
student of  the area: “Realism, for example, paved the way to suc-
cess in intellectual universities and media from around the world, 
so incomparable.Disqualification this theoretical current begins 
with the evidence of  its origin in the United States at the beginning 
of  the Cold War, for this reason establishing the State as the main 
agent of  international relations and security as primary motivation 
of  external action.Realism suggests the world interests, values and 
Western standards of  conduct.Realism is not free nor explains inter-
national relations as you want. Sometimes you may agree to certain 
nations face the realism teaches Parola.He adds that his morale was 
excluded from the beginning.Why would international relations not 
move against realism, which is capable of  producing the unjust or-
der?.” CERVO, Amado Luiz. Concepts in International Relations. 
Journal of  International Politics, Basingstoke, v. 51, n. 2, p. 8-25, 2008. 
Available at: <http://www.scielo.br/pdf/rbpi/v51n2/v51n2a02>. 
Accessed on: 5 apr. 2015.
14 BUCHANAN, Allen; GOLOVE, David. Philosophy of  inter-
national law. In: COLEMAN, Jules L.; HIMMA, Kenneth Einar; 
SHAPIRO, Scott J. The Oxford handbook of  jurisprudence and philosophy 
of  law. Oxford: Oxford University, 2002. p. 868-934. p. 871.
15 BUCHANAN, Allen; GOLOVE, David. Philosophy of  inter-
national law. In: COLEMAN, Jules L.; HIMMA, Kenneth Einar; 
SHAPIRO, Scott J. The Oxford handbook of  jurisprudence and philosophy 
of  law. Oxford: Oxford University, 2002. p. 868-934. p. 871.
16 According to Buchanan and Golove: “There are two ways the 
legal Nihilist view can be understood: as an analytic claim about 
the features a system of  rules must have if  it is to constitute the 
legal system, paired with the assertion that what we call international 
law does not satisfy those conditions;or as a claim that a system of  
rules is not a legal system unless its rules effectively constrain or 
denies the existence of  international law as a field of  
law.
3. hArt And the opportunIty cost of hIs 
AnAlysIs of InternAtIonAl lAw
In a similar fashion to Buchanan and Golove´s cri-
tique, Jeremy Waldron focuses his analysis on the ideas 
supported by Hart in Chapter X of  The Concept ofLaw.
The title of  Waldron’s article is a prelude of  the criti-
cism made against Hart, who would have lost an op-
portunity to effectively contribute to theoretical foun-
dations of  the legal nature of  the international order. 
Hart could have explored the differences between the 
so-calledmunicipal legal systemsandinternationallegal systems17. 
According to Jeremy Waldron:
The real harm lies in the opportunity costs of  Hart’s 
negligence.What we miss is what might have been 
done.[...]It is a pity that the author ofThe Concept 
of Lawran out of  steam or inclination before doing 
this in his last chapter, for it deprived us not only 
of  comparable insights, but of  an example that 
might have inspired some of  Hart’s followers in 
jurisprudence to take up and pursue this challenge18.
Addressing the foundations of  a legal system, Hart 
asserts the existence of  two minimum conditions ne-
cessary and sufficient for the existence of  a legal sys-
tem. First, the rules of  behavior valid according to the 
ultimate criteria of  validity must be generally obeyed. 
Second, its officials must effectively accept the rules of  
change and adjudication as common public standards 
determine the behavior of  those to whom the rules are directed, 
along with the assertion that international law is not effective.” BU-
CHANAN, Allen; GOLOVE, David. Philosophy of  international 
law. In: COLEMAN, Jules L.; HIMMA, Kenneth Einar; SHAPIRO, 
Scott J. The Oxford handbook of  jurisprudence and philosophy of  law. Ox-
ford: Oxford University, 2002. p. 868-934. p. 877.
17 Waldron also explains this distinction, defining municipal le-
gal systems such as those belonging to a particular state, such as 
France or New Zealand, as opposed to an international legal system 
(WALDRON, Jeremy. International law: ‘a relatively small and un-
important’ part of  jurisprudence? NYU School of  Law, Public Law 
Research Paper n. 13-56, p. 209-223, Oct. 2013. p. 209. Available at: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2326758>. 
Accessed on: 5 apr. 2015.) 
18 WALDRON, Jeremy. International law: ‘a relatively small 
and unimportant’ part of  jurisprudence? NYU School of  Law, Pub-
lic Law Research Paper n. 13-56, p. 209-223, Oct. 2013. p. 222-223. 
Available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2326758>. Accessed on: 5 apr. 2015. 
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of  official behavior19. According to Hart, what would 
then be the status of  international law?That is the ques-
tion he does not answer inThe Concept ofLaw.Accor-
ding to the author, international law does not have se-
condary rules, an organized legislature and courts with 
compulsory jurisdiction20.
The absence of  these Institutions means that the 
rules for states resemble that simple form of  social 
structure, consisting only of  primary rules of  
obligation, which when we find it among societies 
of  individuals, we are accustomed to contrast with 
a developed legal system21.
In this sense, Hart asserts that international law lacks 
the secondary rules of  change and adjudication which 
provide for legislature and courts and also a unifying 
rule of  recognition specifying sources of  law, with a ge-
neral criteria for the identification of  its rules22.
Although the author affirms that we must free our-
selves from the assumption that international law must 
necessarily contain a fundamental norm, Hart rejects 
the commonly made analogies between international 
law and domestic law. For him, the rules on operation 
of  international law do not form a system, but a simple 
set of  rules23.
According to Hart, the international legal order 
would be considered primitive:
Both forms of  doubt arise from an adverse 
comparison of  international law with municipal 
19 HART, H. L. A. The concept of  law. 2. ed. New York: Oxford 
University, 1994. p.116. Available at: <http://nw18.american.
edu/~dfagel/Class%20Readings/Hart/International%20Law%20
Chapter%20From%20Concept%20of%20Law.pdf>. Accessed on: 
3 apr. 2015. 
20 HART, H. L. A. The concept of  law. 2. ed. New York: Oxford 
University, 1994. p.216. Available at: <http://nw18.american.
edu/~dfagel/Class%20Readings/Hart/International%20Law%20
Chapter%20From%20Concept%20of%20Law.pdf>. Accessed on: 
3 apr. 2015. 
21 HART, H. L. A. The concept of  law. 2. ed. New York: Oxford 
University, 1994. p. 213-237; p. 214. Available at: <http://nw18.
american.edu/~dfagel/Class%20Readings/Hart/International%20
Law%20Chapter%20From%20Concept%20of%20Law.pdf>. Ac-
cessed on: 3 apr. 2015. 
22 HART, H. L. A. The concept of  law. 2. ed. New York: Oxford 
University, 1994. p.214. Available at: <http://nw18.american.
edu/~dfagel/Class%20Readings/Hart/International%20Law%20
Chapter%20From%20Concept%20of%20Law.pdf>. Accessed on: 
3 apr. 2015. 
23 HART, H. L. A. The concept of  law. 2. ed. New York: Oxford 
University, 1994. p.236. Available at: <http://nw18.american.
edu/~dfagel/Class%20Readings/Hart/International%20Law%20
Chapter%20From%20Concept%20of%20Law.pdf>. Accessed on: 
3 apr. 2015. 
law, which is taken of  the clear, standard example 
of  what law is.The first has its roots deep in the 
conception of  the law fundamentally as matter 
of  orders backed by threats, and contrasts the 
character of  the rules of  international law with 
those of  municipal law.The second form of  doubt 
springs from the obscure belief  that States are 
fundamentally incapable of  being the subjects of  
the legal obligation, and contrasts the character 
of  the subjects of  international law with those of  
municipal law24.
More than criticism, the text of  Jeremy Waldron 
appears to be, in reality, an expression of  regret regar-
ding the superficiality with which Hart depicted the in-
ternational legal system in 1961. Much of  the critical 
appraisal formulated by Waldron is explained by the 
fact that he is a contemporary author, who may refer 
to theories published and events occurred after Hart’s 
work to base his assumptions. Amongst the examples, 
one could remark the operation and own life of  Vien-
na Convention on the Law of  Treaties (1969) or even 
a more outstanding performance of  the International 
Court of  Justice in recent decades. The complex pro-
cesses leading to the emergence of  other standing inter-
national courts after the 1960s at multilateral and regio-
nal levels are also plausible evidences to excuse Hart´s 
arguable negligence or missing opportunity25.
24 HART, H. L. A. The concept of  law. 2. ed. New York: Oxford 
University, 1994. p. 216. Available at: <http://nw18.american.
edu/~dfagel/Class%20Readings/Hart/International%20Law%20
Chapter%20From%20Concept%20of%20Law.pdf>. Accessed on: 
3 apr. 2015. 
25 Previous to Hart, the old scholarship dealing with the founda-
tions of  philosophy of  international law was inevitably influenced 
by monists and dualists. For instance, Eduard Dumbaud (DUM-
BAUD, Edward. The place of  philosophy in international law. Uni-
versity of  Pennsylvania Law Review, Philadelphia, v. 83, n. 5, p. 590-606, 
1935. p. 606-607), resorted to Hans Kelsen and Dionisio Anzilotti to 
formulate his main claims:  “International law is international; it is not the 
internal law of  a super-state or of  a multitude of  states, a composite structure 
like “criminal law” or “contracts”, a conglomeration of  rules prevailing in many 
jurisdictions with respect to a common subject-matter. It is a universal unity, hav-
ing its own constitution and community, made up of  independent states. (2) That 
the fundamental norm is binding must be shown upon moral or political extra-
legal grounds.’ Here may be considered the facts of  international intercourse, the 
pressure of  commercial needs and humanitarian desires’; (3) What the content 
of  the fundamental norm is must be ascertained by observation. It includes the 
rule pacta sunt servanda; (4) The fundamental norm prescribes how law is to 
be made. Sources so referred to are convention, custom and general principles of  
law.’(5) International law sets the orbit within which states may exercise their 
jurisdiction. The doctrine that the jurisdiction of  states is not unlimited, embrac-
ing the whole world, but has definite boundaries is one of  the chief  contribu-
tions of  Anglo-American legal thought to the science of  international law.”; (6) 
International law is not the source of  state law and power, but a limitation on 
it; just as states in the American union derive authority from their own constitu-
tions but are curbed by the federal Constitution.” If  the monistic construction 
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Hart recognizes that the analogies between domes-
tic law and international law may in the future become 
more consistent. In his words:
Perhaps international law is at present in a stage 
of  transition towards acceptance of  this and other 
forms, which would bring it nearer in structure to 
a municipal system. If, and when, this transition is 
completed the formal analogies, which at present 
seem thin and even delusive, would acquire 
substance, and the skeptic’s last doubts about the 
legal ‘quality’ of  international law may then be laid 
to rest.
In his paper, Waldron argues against this perspective 
of  absence of  primary and secondary rules, stating, for 
example, that international law would comprise secon-
dary rules, in line with Hart’s concept of  secondary ru-
les.The difference is that these rules would not be exac-
tly the same as those of  municipal legal systems.Still, 
the very definition of  secondary rules by Hart would 
nowadays be adjusted to international law26.
Waldron refers to the International Court of  Justice 
as a basis to challenge Hart’s assertion, sustaining that 
the court does not act as sole an arbitrator in its current 
decisions.The Court has a deep-rooted role in public 
international law, it has a continuous participation to the 
international norm setting, it achieved prestige among 
States and international organizations, and it passes sig-
nificant decisions and is composed fairly evenly27.
Furthermore, Waldron mentions the distinct nature 
of  law making in the international legal system, in com-
parison to municipal legal systems.Even though they 
operate differently and not in centralized manner, i.e., 
in a single body of  legislative power, contractual and 
bringing international law and the internal law of  every state within the same 
legal system is to be preserved, it must be on the basis of  common dependence 
upon a higher norm.” 
26 “Hart’s basic idea is quite simple.Primary rulesare rules of  
conduct;they tell you what you are legally obligated to do (or refrain 
from) and what consequences attach to obedience or disobedience.
Thus, the criminal law rules that prohibit theft, forbid certain con-
duct and provide for penalties for violating the prohibition.Techni-
cally, the class of  secondary rules includes everything except primary 
rules.The category ofsecondary rules includes legal rules that allow 
for the creation, extinction, and alteration of  primary rules;these 
secondary rules arepower-conferringrules.Thus, contract law em-
powers individuals LEGAL theory lexicon.primary and secondary 
rules. Available at: <http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexi-
con/2004/06/legal_theory_le_2.html>. Accessed on: 5 apr. 2015.
27 WALDRON, Jeremy. International law: ‘a relatively small and 
unimportant’ part of  jurisprudence? NYU School of  Law, Public Law 
Research Paper n. 13-56, p. 209-223, Oct. 2013. p. 216. Available at: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2326758>. 
Accessed on: 5 apr. 2015. 
voluntary creation of  obligations are also present in the 
negotiation and conclusion of  treaties:
Individuals in the municipal order may enter into 
contracts, so states in the international order may 
enter into treaties and vary their obligations to 
one another accordingly.Such powers would be 
unintelligible if  the international order were just 
the system a primary rules.So Hart is not entitled to 
infer - as he does - that the international order is just 
a system of  primary rules (so far the legal change is 
concerned) from the fact that it has no parliament.28
Ruti Teitel also refutes the international law negative 
sustained by Hart. In her own words:
International law has been changing in directions 
that arguably bring it closer, in its forms and ways 
of  operation, to domestic law. For example, this 
can be said of  international law’s development of  
processes and institutions of  judicialization and 
of  the centralization of  its sanctions. Even more 
important, this can be said with regard to the degree 
to which international law has emergent potential 
for the kind of  applicability and direct effect on 
individuals that domestic law routinely displays. It 
follows, therefore, that around the world, courts are 
engaging more often with foreign sources in their 
constitutional jurisprudence29
Some conclusions can be drawn from these premi-
ses. Despite relying on different structures and forms 
of  systematization for the creation and enforcement of  
obligations, this aspect does not imply that the interna-
tional order and the internal order are necessarily dis-
parate, neither impossible to complement one another. 
In fact, as it occurs in municipal law, the international 
order is comprised by rules produced by international 
agents, is shaped by previously determined and existing 
jurisdictions and by critical jurisprudence, either by a 
voluntary inclination or by consensus.
Another point argued by Waldron is that systemic 
legal orders are an element present in greater or lesser 
degree in any order entity, even in municipal legal syste-
ms30.According to the author´s claims inHuman Rights: 
28 WALDRON, Jeremy. International law: ‘a relatively small and 
unimportant’ part of  jurisprudence? NYU School of  Law, Public Law 
Research Paper n. 13-56, p. 209-223, Oct. 2013. p. 217. Available at: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2326758>. 
Accessed on: 5 apr. 2015. 
29 TEITEL, Ruti G. Humanity´s law. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity, 2011. p. 187-188.
30 WALDRON, Jeremy. International law: ‘a relatively small and 
unimportant’ part of  jurisprudence? NYU School of  Law, Public Law 
Research Paper n. 13-56, p. 209-223, Oct. 2013. p. 220. Available at: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2326758>. 
Accessed on: 5 apr. 2015. 
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a Critique of  the Raz / Rawls Approach31, one could ack-
nowledge a greater development of  the international 
systematization of  issues pertaining to fundamental ri-
ghts, in particular with regard to a “human concern” 
approach,such as sustained by Joseph Raz and John 
Rawls32:
The human concern approach’, rights are 
designated as human rights because they are 
rights whose violation is the proper concern of  
all humans. [...] For some adherents of  the human 
concern approach, the relevant human concern 
about rights is not just a matter of  disapproving of  
their violation. It is practical political concern: these 
theorists say that human rights are rights whose 
violations appropriately elicits action on the part 
of  the rest of  humanity against the violators. More 
specifically, views of  this kind focus on the response 
of  governments and international agencies. The 
idea is that we can define a class of  rights such that 
no government, nor any other human agency or 
organization, is even required or permitted to say 
that the violation of  one of  these rights is none of  
their business, no matter where it occurs33.
This approach can be criticized due to other reasons, 
although it reasonable to agree with Waldron’s belief  
that it can provide an interesting basis for the definition 
of  human rights34.
Scott J. Shapiro and Ona A. Hathaway, in their paper 
entitled Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International 
Law35, address the neglect of  international law in Hart´s 
theory and the question of  whether or not international 
law is law. 
31 WALDRON, Jeremy. Human rights: a critique of  the raz/rawls 
approach. NYU School of  Law, Public Law Research Paper, N. 13-32, 
June 2013. Available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2272745>. Accessed on: 5 apr. 2015.
32 According to Waldron: WALDRON, Jeremy. Human rights: a 
critique of  the raz/rawls approach. NYU School of  Law, Public Law 
Research Paper, N. 13-32, June 2013. p. 3. Available at: <http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2272745>. Accessed 
on: 5 apr. 2015. 
33 WALDRON, Jeremy. Human rights: a critique of  the raz/rawls 
approach. NYU School of  Law, Public Law Research Paper, N. 13-32, 
June 2013. p. 2. Available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2272745>. Accessed on: 5 apr. 2015. 
34 The author appears to be sympathetic, however, with the “hu-
man carrier approach” which purports human rights as those car-
ried by and belonging to all individuals by virtue of  their human-
ity. WALDRON, Jeremy. Human rights: a critique of  the raz/rawls 
approach. NYU School of  Law, Public Law Research Paper, N. 13-32, 
June 2013. p.2. Available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2272745>. Accessed on: 5 apr. 2015. 
35 HATHAWAY, Oona A; SHAPIRO, Scott J. Outcasting: en-
forcement in domestic and international law. Yale Law Journal, Con-
necticut, v. 1, n. 2, p. 252-349, Nov. 2011.
Shapiro and Hathaway support that the traditional 
critique of  international law is based on a limited and 
inaccurate understanding of  law enforcement. Critics 
assume that a regime is law if  this system relies on in-
ternal enforcement mechanisms of  its own rules em-
ploying force and intimidation through violence to en-
force their own rules. The authors call this conception 
of  Modern State Conception36.
Shapiro and Hathaway assert the necessity to over-
come this conception. In their words:
We are able to see that allowing the Modern State 
Conception to set the terms of  the debate over 
international law leads us to ask and answer the 
wrong questions. Yes, very little of  international 
law meets the Modern State Conception of  
international law—very little (if  any) of  it is 
enforced through brute physical force deployed by 
an institution enforcing its own rules. But what is 
interesting is not so much what international law 
is not, but what it is. And that is law that operates 
almost entirely through outcasting and external 
enforcement.37
The authors recognize the importance to overcome 
the Modern State Conception in order to conceive an 
international legal order, and the concept of  outcasting 
is fundamental in this attempt. Addressing the human 
rights field, they affirm that: 
Human rights scholarship, in particular, has 
highlighted the ways in which states are sometimes 
publicly singled out for their violations of  human 
rights laws as a nonviolent means of  discouraging 
law-breaking behavior38.
4. the reAlIstIc chAllenge fAced by buchA-
nAn And golove: A response through the 
globAl expAnsIon of humAn rIghts
In an attempt to discuss the possibilities of  contem-
porary conception of  a moral theory of  international 
law, Buchanan and Golove face the challenges presen-
ted by the criticism already settled by realism. In his 
36 HATHAWAY, Oona A.; SHAPIRO, Scott J. Outcasting: en-
forcement in domestic and international law. Yale Law Journal, Con-
necticut, v. 1, n. 2, p. 252-349, Nov. 2011. p. 258.
37 HATHAWAY, Oona A.; SHAPIRO, Scott J. Outcasting: en-
forcement in domestic and international law. Yale Law Journal, Con-
necticut, v. 1, n. 2, p. 252-349, Nov. 2011. p. 302.
38   HATHAWAY, Oona A.; SHAPIRO, Scott J. Outcasting: 
enforcement in domestic and international law. Yale Law Journal, 
Connecticut, v. 1, n. 2, p. 252-349, Nov. 2011. p. 309.
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analysis, Buchanan and Golove maintain that realism in 
its pure positivist facade is a descriptive and explanatory 
account of  the nature of  the international relations. 
The authors draw an implication called “meta-ethics” 
of  the descriptive-explanatory theory, namely, that mo-
rality would not apply to international relations39.
However, most authors who are affiliated to a des-
criptive and explanatory approach assert an important 
moral inference, even when denying the application of  
moral principles to international relations in general - 
the inference that State leaders should act on their own 
interests without regard to any moral constraint.
According to the views of  two prominent theorists 
of  legal realism who sought to analyze the internatio-
nal context, Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric Posner, States 
would act from political choices, thus being guided by a 
prudential bias. In line with this thought, international 
law could be seen by means of  the states’ self-interest, 
corroborated by political decision-making activities in 
a rational fashion. These choices represent a specific 
type of  policy, which is based on precedent, tradition, 
interpretation and other practices and concepts that are 
familiar to domestic law40.
Buchanan and Golove maintain that, for realism, the 
nature of  international relations excludes morality in 
this sphere. Hence, a moral theory of  international law 
would be an exercise of  futility41.
The authors distinguish a positive variant of  realism, 
called “fiduciary realism”, which describes the interna-
tional relations as a Hobbesian state of  war. Along with 
this view, responsible state officials should act only in 
order to maximize the survival prospects of  their States, 
regardless of  any moral constraints. Fiduciary realists 
are not moral, neither skeptical nihilists. They believe 
39 BUCHANAN, Allen; GOLOVE, David. Philosophy of  inter-
national law. In: COLEMAN, Jules L.; HIMMA, Kenneth Einar; 
SHAPIRO, Scott J. The Oxford handbook of  jurisprudence and philosophy 
of  law. Oxford: Oxford University, 2002. p. 868-934. p. 873.
40 According to Goldsmith and Posner: “It is politics, but a spe-
cial kind of  politics, one that relies heavily on precedent, tradition, 
interpretation and other practices and concepts familiar from do-
mestic law”. GOLDSMITH, Jack L.; POSNER, Eric A. The limits of  
international law.New York: Oxford University, 2005; and DWORK-
ING, Ronald. A new philosophy for international law. Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, v. 41, n. 1, p. 2-30, Winter 2013. p. 202.
41 BUCHANAN, Allen; GOLOVE, David. Philosophy of  inter-
national law. In: COLEMAN, Jules L.; HIMMA, Kenneth Einar; 
SHAPIRO, Scott J. The Oxford handbook of  jurisprudence and philosophy 
of  law. Oxford: Oxford University, 2002. p. 868-934. p. 873.
that State officials have obligations to their people, but 
to obey these obligations they require the rejection of  
any moral restraint in relation with other States.Fiducia-
ry realists disregard other moral principles besides the 
fundamental moral obligation, that is, to serve the inte-
rests of  the State itself42.
Under this Hobbesian context, described by positi-
ve realism, international relations include the following 
features, according to the analysis of  Buchanan and 
Golove:
a.There is no global sovereign, no supreme 
arbiter capable of  enforcing rules of  peaceful co-
operation.b.There is (approximate) equality of  
power, such that no one state can permanently 
dominate all others;c.The fundamental preference 
of  states is to survive;d.Given conditions (a) and 
(b), what is rational for each state to do is to strive 
by all means to dominate others in to avoid being 
dominated (to rely on what Hobbes calls ‘the 
principle of  anticipation’);e.In a situation in which 
each party rationally anticipates that it is rational 
for others to dominate, without constraints on 
the means they use to do so, moral principles are 
inapplicable.43
Indeed, Goldsmith and Posner argue that the best 
explanation to understand when and why States obey 
the rules of  international law would not be because the 
States internalized this law, or because they have the ha-
bit of  acting in a specific way, or even supported by 
moral reasons, but simply because they act according to 
their own interests.44
According to Buchanan and Golove, the positivist 
realism assumes questionable empirical generalizations 
about the international sphere, while the fiduciary rea-
lism takes into account these empirical generalizations 
and concludes that the State authority will disregard any 
moral restraint in order to achieve the interests of  the 
State.45
42 BUCHANAN, Allen; GOLOVE, David. Philosophy of  inter-
national law. In: COLEMAN, Jules L.; HIMMA, Kenneth Einar; 
SHAPIRO, Scott J. The Oxford handbook of  jurisprudence and philosophy 
of  law. Oxford: Oxford University, 2002. p. 868-934. p. 873.
43 BUCHANAN, Allen; GOLOVE, David. Philosophy of  inter-
national law. In: COLEMAN, Jules L.; HIMMA, Kenneth Einar; 
SHAPIRO, Scott J. The Oxford handbook of  jurisprudence and philosophy 
of  law. Oxford: Oxford University, 2002. p. 868-934. p. 872.
44 GOLDSMITH, Jack L.; POSNER, Eric A. The limits of  interna-
tional law.New York: Oxford University, 2005. p. 225.
45 BUCHANAN, Allen; GOLOVE, David. Philosophy of  inter-
national law. In: COLEMAN, Jules L.; HIMMA, Kenneth Einar; 
SHAPIRO, Scott J. The Oxford handbook of  jurisprudence and philosophy 
of  law. Oxford: Oxford University, 2002. p. 868-934. p. 874.
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íci
us
 M
ac
ha
do
. T
he
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
y o
f 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l l
aw
 in
 co
nt
em
po
ra
ry
 sc
ho
lar
sh
ip
: o
ve
rc
om
in
g 
ne
gl
ig
en
ce
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
e g
lo
ba
l 
ex
pa
ns
io
n 
of
 h
um
an
 ri
gh
ts
 ?.
 R
ev
ist
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
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Buchanan and Golove assert that most of  the in-
teresting work in international relations over the past 
two decades indicates that the international relations 
are not, in fact, a Hobbesian context of  war of  one 
against all.According to recent studies, there are stable 
patterns of  peaceful cooperation and effective suprana-
tional regimes, some bilateral, some regional and some 
genuinely global in scope - including military alliances 
defense, financial systems, trade agreements, structures 
for scientific, environmental agreements and internatio-
nal media to human rights, economic development and 
disaster relief.
Furthermore, the ability to make credible commit-
ments for peaceful cooperation is a valuable asset to the 
states and individuals.The techniques for building trust 
are varied and ubiquitous.According to Buchanan and 
Golove, survival is not an issue, not the only question, 
in various contexts of  state interaction.States are also 
not equal in power and, as a result, their vulnerability 
is a concrete factor. Powerful states can take risks in 
an effort to build cooperation and they can minimize 
the risks acting in a cooperative manner, as the costs of  
betraying their trust may be great.
The moral minimalism, in turn, argues that the dis-
tinction between international law and national law is 
that the latter is comprised of  a framework of  rules for 
those who share the same purposes, while the former 
does not.However, as generally observed elsewhere, in 
a liberal society domestic public order cannot be based 
on shared purposes other than security and justice.So 
the moral minimalism must answer for what reason the 
lack of  shared purpose precludes the normative theory 
of  international law, but not a liberal domestic society.
The claim that there is a nuclear concept of  justice 
capable of  providing the basis for a theory of  morally 
robust international law is an empirical claim about the 
extent of  moral disagreement beyond the borders of  
States. It is possible to argue, however, that there is, in 
fact, a global culture expanding human rights, reflec-
ting a growing consensus on a conception of  justice 
based on the recognition of  equality and freedom of  
all people and a fair conception of  sovereignty suscep-
tible to limitations.46.According to this view, the notion 
46 In this sense, it is worth mentioning the Article 1 of  the Uni-
versal Declaration of  Human Rights: Art. 1:All human beings are 
born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit 
of  brotherhood. UNITED NATIONS. The Universal Declaration of  
of  equality and freedom expressed in the main human 
rights conventions may provide the basis for the deve-
lopment of  a moral theory of  international law, whose 
content is substantial.
In fact, the international legal system already inclu-
des principles, practices and institutions that are con-
tributing to the emergence of  a greater consensus on 
the content of  human rights standards.For example, the 
various processes and mechanisms by which the enfor-
cement of  human rights has been monitored, including 
the operation of  the UN Human Rights Council and 
Committees covering the 1966 Covenants on Civil and 
Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Ri-
ghts47.These processes contribute to the formation of  
broadly shared beliefs and certainty about the content 
of  human rights.
On the other hand, it is important to notice that 
the emergence of  a culture in the global expansion of  
human rights has flowered in the context of  the con-
solidation of  human rights in states constitutions. In 
this sense, United States constitution had a profound 
impact upon the development of  international human 
rights law. Besides assisting in the clarification of  these 
rights, the American constitution has helped to shape 
the norms found in the principal international human 
rights instruments48.
However, it is remarkable the differences between 
the provisions of  the constitution and the international 
human rights instruments. Some rights expressly inclu-
ded in the international instruments are not found in 
the text of  the American constitution and many others 
have far wider scope than their United States consti-
Human Rights. Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/
udhr/>. Accessed on: 20 jan. 2015. In the 1930s, the scholarship 
recognized the emergent landscape for “humanitarian and social leg-
islation” in international law and how this trend would be linked to 
the “end of  law”, such as contended by Edward Dumbaud, DUM-
BAUD, Edward. The place of  philosophy in international law. Uni-
versity of  Pennsylvania Law Review, Philadelphia, v. 83, n. 5, p. 590-606, 
1935. p. 605: “Self-assertion and clinging to abstract legal rights can 
find no better illustration than that afforded by the dominant doc-
trine of  state sovereignty in international law. Yet a growing mass of  
social and humanitarian legislation in the international field shows 
that the world is awake to the necessity of  protecting social interests 
by means of  legal machinery”.
47 UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS. United Nations Hu-
man Rights Council. Available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbod-
ies/hrc/pages/hrcindex.aspx>. Accessed on: 20 jan. 2015. 
48 LILLICH, Richard B. The United States constitution and inter-
national human rights law. Harvard Human Rights Journal, London, v. 
3, p. 53-81, Spring 1990. p. 56.
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tutional counterparts49.The argument advocated by 
Buchanan and Golove about the existence of  a culture 
in global expansion of  human rights is also evident in 
the transconstitutionalism theory addressed by Marcelo 
Neves50. He argues that the human rights claim to be 
valid for the system legal world of  multiple levels, so to 
any existing legal order in world society.
In this sense, the field of  human rights, which was 
once seen as a domestic issue, today is addressed under 
multiple overlapping orders not only concentrated at 
the state level, but also at international, supranational, 
transnational and local levels.
James Griffin, writing about the autonomy of  inter-
national law of  human rights, argues that the transition 
process from human moral rights to positivized human 
rights is still ongoing and entails a return to the original 
ideas of  lack of  separation between law and moral.51 
Marcelo Neves discusses the theory called by him 
“multidimensional transconstitutionalism of  human ri-
ghts” and places them on the border of  the legal sys-
tem, binding it to a moral inclusion and dissent:
It should be noted that the conditions for the emer-
gence of  human rights in modern society is related to 
the emergence of  a structural dissent, concerning not 
only the plurality of  communicational spheres with pre-
tense of  autonomy (systemic complexity), but also the 
heterogeneity of  expectations, interests and values of  
individuals and groups.In this sense, it is defining the 
concept of  human rights, to set it as normative expec-
tations of  generalized legal inclusion under conditions 
of  structural dissent of  society worldwide.Therefore, 
human rights are located on the border of  the legal sys-
tem, binding it to a moral of  inclusion and dissent, whi-
ch circulates with relevance in the global society of  the 
present, in competition with other moral standards52. 
In order to explain the multidimensional nature of  
human rights and the emergence of  what Buchanan 
49 LILLICH, Richard B. The United States constitution and inter-
national human rights law. Harvard Human Rights Journal, London, v. 
3, p. 53-81, Spring 1990. p. 57.
50 NEVES, Marcelo. Transconstitucionalismo. São Paulo: M. Fontes, 
2009. p. 253.
51 GRIFFIN, James. Human rights and the autonomy of  inter-
national law. In: BESSON, Samantha;TASIOULAS, John.(Ed.). The 
philosophy of  international law.New York: Oxford University, 2010. p. 
339-356.
52 NEVES, Marcelo. Transconstitucionalismo. São Paulo: M. Fontes, 
2009. p. 255. (free translation).
and Golove call an expansion of  the global culture of  
human rights, Marcelo Neves analyses an array of  ju-
dicial cases that demonstrated that human rights issues 
permeate various legal systems.
In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on Roper 
v.Simmons53,a case which discussed the possibility of  
applying the death penalty to a juvenile, taking into 
account the prohibition to cruel and unusual punish-
ments established at Eighth Amendment of  the Ame-
rican Constitution.54 After being sentenced to death by 
the jury, the Supreme Court,in a tight scrutiny (5-4),the 
death penalty was removed, having been argued in the 
vote ofJusticeAnthony Kennedy that the United States 
were alone in a world that has turned against the dea-
th penalty for juveniles.The decision, demonstrated the 
possibilities of  coordination between national law and 
established practice outside the domestic sphere in the 
context of  constitutional dialogue55.
At this point, it is worth mentioning that the Supre-
me Court decision had a great reverberation, resulting 
in the revocation of  dozens of  death sentences directed 
to individuals who committed crimes when they were 
still juveniles. This approach reveals how moral values 
conceived by the international community are penetra-
ting domestic legal orders and rejects the critique of  
realist theory about the supposedly little exogenous in-
fluence of  the human rights on state behavior56.
Marcelo Neves, discussing this case, also mentions 
the analysis of  Jeremy Waldron on the issue.Waldron 
sees the decision of  the American judges from the re-
construction of  the old concept ofjus gentium,indicating 
the formation of  a set of  knowledge that can be refe-
renced each other.In the words of  Marcelo Nevesin a 
free translation:
From this argument, Waldron argues that the 
citation of  foreign and international law by the US 
Supreme Court should not be seen as a random 
practice in pieces unrelated, but as a model for 
53 UNITED STATES. Supreme Court of  the United States. Rop-
er, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center vs. Simmons. n. 03-633. Avail-
able at: <http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/u-s-supreme-court-rop-
er-v-simmons-no-03-633>. Accessed on: 20 jan. 2015.
54 NEVES, Marcelo. Transconstitucionalismo. São Paulo: M. Fontes, 
2009. p. 257.
55 NEVES, Marcelo. Transconstitucionalismo. São Paulo: M. Fontes, 
2009. p. 258.
56 POSNER, Eric; GOLDSMITH, Jack. L. The Limits of  Inter-
national Law. Oxford: Oxford University, 2005; and DWORKING, 
Ronald. A new philosophy for international law. Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, v. 41, n. 1, p. 2-30, Winter 2013. p. 133.
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action in connection network between various legal 
systems, for the solution common problems.
Another practical example that illustrates the expan-
sion of  global culture of  human rights is the case Hazel 
Tau x Glaxo and Boehringer57,related to the claim access 
to medication to combat HIV before the Commission 
of  the South African Competition.In this case, the de-
cision of  the South Antitrust Commission, based on 
national law, was favorable to the applicants, arguing 
that the excessive price of  antiretroviral drugs is direc-
tly responsible for premature, predictable and avoidable 
deaths of  people living with HIV, including both chil-
dren and adults.58
It is clear, thereby, that in a matter of  intellectual 
property, which brings elements of  national, internatio-
nal and transnational law, it becomes even more clear 
the need to elevate the discussion to a point where they 
do not opt for a simple solution based on the preva-
lence of  a particular legal system over another.Marcelo 
Neves treats this issue as follows, in a free translation:
In addition to lead to discussion of  the problem 
of  the horizontal effects of  fundamental rights in 
the transnational context, surpassing the national 
level, this discussion points to the intertwining 
issues between regulatory orders.The simple 
internationalist appeal to a generous interpretation 
of  the TRIPS agreement, or exclusive reliance 
transnational model of  self-regulation and, finally, 
the argument by a final state solution based 
on the sovereignty of  the people, appear not 
complex enough in such cases.The respective 
orders legitimacy limits may not also be the last 
argument to exclude them from the process of  
finding a consistent solution and socially adequate.
Without theultima ratiopresent in any of  the orders, 
the solution regarding the transnational human 
rights, in the case mentioned, shows that the 
key is to restrictthe expansive nature of  certain 
legal orders over others (avoid the danger of  the 
dedifferentiation), as well how to limit the expansion 
of  regulatory orders and their organizations 
working towards the expansion of  the exclusion 
and the destruction of  the chemical the person 
biopsychic support 
Therefore, the distinction that Buchanan and Golo-
ve present about transnational justice principles - that 
57 UNITED STATES. Supreme Court of  the United States. Ha-
zel Tau vs. Glaxo and Boehringer. Available at: <http://www.tac.org.
za/Documents/DrugCompaniesCC/HazelTauAndOthersVGlaxo-
SmithKlineAndOthersStatementOfComplaint.doc>. Accessed on: 
20 jan. 2016.
58 NEVES, Marcelo. Transconstitucionalismo. São Paulo: M. Fontes, 
2009. p. 267.
would be related to the rights and duties between mem-
bers of  the same state or between the government and 
the members of  state should be recognized by interna-
tional law as universal – it is possible to recognize that 
the progress of  international law involves the expansion 
of  transnational justice and the expansion of  global cul-
ture of  human rights has a decisive role59 and 60.
Facing the humanity Law as an emerging transnatio-
nal legal order, Vicki Jackson argues “we now live in a 
world of  multiple legal orders where there is not cen-
tralization, or monopoly, or a hierarchy of  interpretative 
authority, and where interpretative legitimacy is a con-
cept that pertains to non-state actors as well”61.
5. fInAl remArks
As it can be seen, the architecture of  international 
law and the philosophy of  law still have room for fur-
ther development.The institutionalization of  principles, 
the expansion of  human rights and the case law of  se-
dimentation in international courts have raised more 
reflection and discussion on this topic.
Increasingly, contemporary authors like Jeremy 
Waldron, Allen Buchanan and David Golove, among 
others, have been contributing to a review of  juridical 
59 BUCHANAN, Allen; GOLOVE, David. Philosophy of  inter-
national law. In: COLEMAN, Jules L.; HIMMA, Kenneth Einar; 
SHAPIRO, Scott J. The Oxford handbook of  jurisprudence and philosophy 
of  law. Oxford: Oxford University, 2002. p. 868-934. p. 887.
60 According to Buchanan and Golove, the justification oh hu-
man rights can be presented as (1) principles whose effective insti-
tutionalization maximizes overall utility, (2) as required for the ef-
fectiveness of  other important rights, (3) as needed to satisfy basic 
needs that are universal to all human beings, (4) as needed to nurture 
fundamental human capacities that constitute or are instrumentally 
valuable for well-being or human flourishing, (5) as required by 
respect for human dignity, (6) as the institutional embodiment of  
a ‘common good conception of  justice’ according to which each 
member of  society’s good counts, (7) as required by the most fun-
damental principle of  morality, the principle of  equal concern and 
respect for persons, (8) as principles that would be chosen by parties 
representing individuals in a ‘global original position’ behind a ‘veil 
of  ignorance’, and (9) as necessary conditions for the intersubjective 
justification of  political principles and hence as a requirement for 
political legitimacy BUCHANAN, Allen; GOLOVE, David. Philos-
ophy of  international law. In: COLEMAN, Jules L.; HIMMA, Ken-
neth Einar; SHAPIRO, Scott J. The Oxford handbook of  jurisprudence 
and philosophy of  law. Oxford: Oxford University, 2002. p. 868-934. 
p. 889.
61 TEITEL, Ruti G. Humanity´s law. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity, 2011. p. 187.
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and philosophical theories in vogue on the nature of  in-
ternational law.Whether due to State interests, whether 
to the advancement of  the international organizations’ 
agenda, this debate has also increased its attention to 
the issue in main international forums.
Although there is stillthe need for better understan-
ding of  the relationship between the various currents 
of  international law and international relations, it is pos-
sible to understand that the expansion of  human rights 
indicates from the outset the possibility of  designing a 
moral theory within the framework of  international law.
The existence of  a global culture expanding human ri-
ghts is directly related to convergence towards a nuclear 
common conception of  justice, and moral progress of  
international law through the improvement of  institu-
tionalization of  the principles and by forming mecha-
nisms that enable its effective application.
The international human rights are currently much 
more integrated with the consolidation of  institutions as 
the Human Rights Council and the European Court of  
Human Rights. To the extent that it increases forms of  ac-
cess to international courts, converging regulatory regimes 
transnational in nature and advancing the performance of  
subjects and actors in the international order, there are also 
new conflicts and contradictions to the theorists of  the phi-
losophy of  law, which comes to contribute to the determi-
nation of  these concepts and inconsistencies.
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